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ARE INSTALMENT PLANS USURIOUS?
THE INSTALMENT CREDIT INDUSTRY
The extension of instalment credit to the consumer has grown
to such an extent that it totals twice the amount of all other
forms of consumer credit outstanding.1 Instalment credit is offered
through two mediums: the direct loan to the consumer of cash or
its equivalent; and the instalment "sale," by which the consumer
receives credit, repayable by instalments, at the time of purchase
of the commodity sought-ostensibly indirectly from the financing
agency through the dealer.
Direct loans are generally made by banks or small loan com-
panies, both of which are regulated as to the permissible charges,
not only as to noninstalment loans2 and "small loans," 3 but as
to instalment loans as well. In Minnesota, the statute4 permits
banks or trust companies, but: not others, to charge six per cent
per year upon any loan up to fifteen hundred dollars which is re-
payable in instalments, computed upon the entire amount until
1. 38 Fed. Res. Bull. 198 (1952). Although total consumer credit, in-
cluding instalment credit, by 1951 had increased to 285 per cent of that in 1939,
instalment credit alone increased to over 305 per cent.
2. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 334.01 (1949), which states that "no person shall
directly or indirectly take or receive .. . any greater sum . . . for the loan
or forbearance of money . .. than $8.00 on $100 for one year . . ." The
provisions as to maximum rate of interest vary among the states, but it is
usually not lower than 6 per cent nor higher than 10 per cent. Some states
seem to have changed their maximum rates with the changes in social atti-
tudes, usually becoming more liberal. See 6 Williston, Contracts § 1683
(rev. ed. 1938). Minnesota, following the lead of New York and other
commercial states, enacted in 1947 a statute which deprived corporations of
the defense of usury. Minn. Stat. § 334.021 (1949). Such statutes have been
held constitutional. See 6 Williston, Contracts § 1683, n. 3; Legis., 33 Minn.
L. Rev. 27, 37 (1948).
3. Minnesota provides that a licensee under the small loan act may
charge up to 3 per cent per month of the unpaid balance of a loan not
exceeding three hundred dollars. Minn. Stat. § 56.13 (1949). In actual
practice, small loan companies in Minneapolis and St. Paul have been ad-
vertising and charging rates amounting effectively to between 1% and 2%
per cent per month. In 1949 New York, evidently surveying the actual
charges and taking cognizance of the decreasing value of the dollar, per-
mitted licensees to loan up to five hundred dollars but set the interest rate
at 21 per cent per month on amounts not over one hundred dollars, 2 per
cent up to three hundred dollars, and Y per cent on any amount remaining
over three hundred but less than five hundred dollars. N. Y. Banking Law§ 352.
The small loan acts, liberal in allowable interest rates by comparison
with general usury statutes, have served effectively to drive out the "loan
sharks" lending small amounts of -money to needy borrowers at rates often
as high as 133 per cent. See, e.g., Bennett and Heffner, The Campaign
Against Auto Loan Usurers in New York State (1940).
4. Minn. Stat. § 48.153 (1949).
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the stated due date of the loan; the allowable minimum charge is
three dollars. This statute raises the allowable effective rate of
interest for instalment loans from the eight per cent allowed gen-
erally5 to slightly less than twelve per cent for a twelve-month
loan and yet higher for loans of longer terms. This increase in the
effective charge arises because the borrower repaying principal
and interest by instalments retains on the average only one-half
of the principal amount borrowed, but he pays the same flat rate
as if he had retained the full amount until maturity of the- loan. 6
The expenses of investigation, monthly notification or furnishing
a monthly coupon book, and extra bookkeeping costs, as well as
the expense of collection when payment is late or in default,7 in-
crease the cost of making the loan to the extent that, at the popular
rate for commercial loans of effectively six per cent, only the large
volume banks could break even or make little more than a slight
profit." Special instalment loan statutes at higher interest rates
are therefore economically justifiable.
The tremendous growth of instalment credit and its virtual
strangle-hold upon an economy dependent upon mass production
to maintain its climbing standards 9 have been factors which, aided
by the inability to profit on direct instalment loans under general
usury laws, gave early rise to the indirect instalment credit and
its phenomenal counterpart, the sales finance company.10 There
can be no doubt that without the sales finance company, dealers,
particularly in the automobile industry, would be hard pressed to
maintain their present high incidence of sales on an instalment
payment plan. In 1950 banks held as purchasers of the instalment
5. See note 2 supra.
6. See General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F. 2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 312 U. S. 682 (1941) (affirming order that General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corporation cease and desist from advertising its "6% Time Pay-
ment Plan" since it tended to mislead a substantial part of the buying public).
7. Minn. Stat. § 48.155 (1949) provides for this expense by allowing ad-
ditional charges of 5 per cent of the amount overdue with a maximum of
fifty cents on one instalment, or interest on the overdue payment at 6 per
cent per annum, if greater.
8. See Baird, Commercial Bank Activity in Conmoner Instalment
Financing, 33 Fed. Res. Bull. 264, 265 (1947). But even with the higher
rate allowable under the instalment loan statute, banks small and large
generally charge only 5 per cent, which effectively amounts to slightly
less than 10 per cent. See Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on
Instalhnent Financing, State of New York Legislative Document No. 63,
16 (1949).
9. See Isaacs, Instalment Selling: The Relation between Its Develop-
ment in Modern B siness and the Law, 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 141 (1935).
10. For the historical development of the sales finance company, see
Seidman, Finance Companies and Factors 10 (1949).
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paper less than one-third of the outstanding automobile sale credit.,,
Their lack of popularity with dealers in comparison with finance
companies stems largely from the fact that banks are inherently
more cautious as to credit risks while some finance companies will
finance anyone who can make the down payment.
Furthermore, particularly with the finance companies, dealer
participation in the finance charge has become a lucrative source
of profit.'2 A recent survey in New York13 revealed that some
portion of the finance charge is almost always paid to the dealer,
and the amount depends largely upon competition between financing
agencies to purchase the instalment paper from the dealers. The
agencies themselves reported that dealers receive up to seven
per cent of the amount financed or up to thirty per cent of the
finance charge. Investigators reported, however, that actually deal-
ers participate much more in the finance charge, some instances
being up to eighty-five per cent! An attorney for one of the largest
sales finance companies has scoffed at studies made of the "occa-
sional" abuses of a small minority in the financing field,14 while
at the same time finance companies have admitted they paid rebates
unwillingly and denounced the bonus as "commercial bribery."' 1
The bonus sets higher rates to the consumer and has no possible
relation to the cost of financing. The "reserve" plan of setting
aside a percentage of the finance charge to compensate dealers
for losses on automobiles repurchased after repossession by the
finance company also results in an unfair rate to the consumer
because the reserves established are generally higher than the
11. 38 Fed. Res. Bull. 198-199 (1952).
12. Originally, indorsement of the purchaser's note and contract to the
sales finance company was with recourse to the dealer in event of default by
the purchaser, but when competition arose in the financing industry some
companies introduced a non-recourse plan-which delighted dealers. To
combat this plan, the three finance companies with the major share of the
business, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (G.M.A.C.), Commercial
Investment Trust, Inc. (C.I.T.), and Commercial Credit Company (C.C.C.),
adopted the "repurchase" plan. By this plan dealers were only obligated to
repurchase cars repossessed by the finance company, and a reserve was set
up from a percentage of the finance charge to reimburse the dealer for any
losses incurred by repurchase. The smaller independent companies came back
with bonuses to the auto dealers, and when sales profits were low dealers
would "pack" the finance charge to the unsuspecting purchaser in order to
increase the size of the bonus. See Cavers, The Consumner-s Stake in the
Finance Company Code Controversy, 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 200, 202-204(1935).
13. Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Installment Financ-
ing, op. cit. supra note 8, at 19.
14. Ecker, Commentary o "Usury in Instalment Sales," 2 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 173, 188 (1935).
1 -5. Cavers, supra note 12, at 207.
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concededly small number of losses realized and in actuality they
amount to a flat rebate. 16
There can be no doubt that the expenses of the sales finance
company, like those of the direct instalment lender, are sufficiently
higher, even among the most efficient companies, to justify charging
more than is generally allowable under usury statutes. But in actual
operations, the unregulated finance charges exacted for instalment
sale credit are subject to such great abuse that the unsuspecting
public is being milked of valuable purchasing power. The rationale
invariably advanced by the indirect financing agencies is that their
expenses caused by default are so great as to justify higher
charges.' 7 It is conceded that some sales finance companies will
accept credit risks not acceptable for direct bank loans, but with
down payments of one-third of the cash price and provisions for
not over-long periods to pay off the balance,' 8 as well as require-
ments for collision insurance acceptable to the finance company
(at the purchaser's expense), it is hard to conceive of a situation
wherein the company could incur any losses except in exceptional
cases-which direct lenders have also. When the direct instalment
lender is allowed, as in Minnesota, a higher rate than for commer-
cial loans, a rate no higher or lower is similarly justified for the
sales finance company.
THE INSTALMENT FINANCE CHARGE UNDER
GENERAL UsURY LAWS
While the courts have acknowledged that the instalment pur-
chaser may be the victim of an unscrupulous seller,' 9 they are
16. Ibid.
17. See, e.g., Ecker, supra note 14, at 177.
18. The percentage down payment which was required for automobiles
under Regulation W was Y3 of the cash price, with only eighteen months in
which to pay. 37 Fed. Res. Bull. 958 (1951). This applied only to automobiles
of a year-model later than 1942, 38 id. 29 (1952), but in practice terms made
on prewar models have generally been more stringent than those required for
newer models.
19. In Commercial Credit Co. v. Shelton, 139 Miss. 132, 139, 104 So.
75, 76 (1925), after counsel argued that those who cannot afford to pay
cash are taken advantage of, the court said: "We . . . would add thereto
that there seems to have been a large increase in the population of the
country since ... the sage proclaimed that 'a sucker is born every minute.'"
But see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 78,
262 S. W. 425, 428 (1924). The argument that the purchaser does not have
to buy if he does not like the price and is therefore not like the needy bor-
rower for whom the usury statutes were enacted is fallacious. The only
reason the consumer buys on time is that he does not have the cash but
needs the commodity, and he is generally ignorant of the actual effective
charge. Furthermore, usury statutes are applied irrespective of the bor-
rower's necessities. See Berger, Usury in Instahnent Sales, 2 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 148, 151 (1935).
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almost hopelessly split in determining in what situations the in-
stalment charge comes under the usury statute. A usurious trans-
action has three essential elements: (1) a loan or forbearance
or money; (2) an agreement to return money absolutely; (3) an
agreement to pay in excess of the lawful interest rateY0 While
the element of intent is generally required, chiefly to characterize
transactions not in the form of loans,21 direct intent to evade
the law is not necessary in Minnesota but intent to obtain interest
which is in fact excessive is sufficient.2 2 The element of an agree-
ment to return money absolutely is purely academic ;23 the major
problem facing the courts has been the definition of "forbearance,"
since the determination of whether excessive "interest" has been
agreed to24 depends upon whether there has been a loan or for-
bearance from which "interest" might arise.
To the consumer a direct loan transaction results in the same
purchase as the indirect instalment credit,2 5 but the former is
closely regulated by usury statutes and scrutinized by the courts,
while the latter may be completely unregulated. A majority of the
courts favor the rule that a credit sale of property is not a forbear-
ance of money unless the sale is a mere sham or device to evade the
usury law. 28 Thus, whether the sale is a mere device to cover
usury2 7 is a question for the trier of fact,28 and in actual practice
20. See Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 573, 13 N. W. 2d 739,
743 (1944); 6 Williston, Contracts § 1684; Note, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 585,
586-587 (1937).
21. See 6 Williston, Contracts § 1698.
22. Fred G. Clark Co. v. E. C. Warner Co., 188 Minn. 277, 247 N. W.
225 (1933) ; see Dege v. Produce Exchange Bank, 212 Minn. 44, 47, 2 N. W.
2d 423, 425 (1942); Nelson v. Satre, 111 Minn. 60, 61, 126 N. W. 399
(1910). But no mere clerical error in computing interest, made without
interit to avoid the statute, shall constitute usury. Minn. Stat. § 334.03
(1949).
23. In one case, however, a lender attempted to avoid the usury statute
by agreeing to assume the hazards of loss of the automobile; the attempt
was unsuccessful as a device to evade the statute since the risk assumed
bore no reasonable relation to the finance charge. Stuback v. Sussman, 8
N. Y. S. 2d 141 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 903, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 240
(1st Dep't 1939).
24. By his agreement, however, the borrower is not particeps crininis
with the lender irrespective of his knowledge or intent. See, e.g., Seebold
v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 581, 13 N. W. 2d 739, 747 (1944).
25. See Berger, supra note 19, at 148.
26. See, e.g., Blackmore Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 32 F. 2d 433, 435 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 586 (1929) (not usurious) ; Seebold v. Euster-
mann, 216 Minn. 566, 573, 13 N. 1W. 2d 739, 744 (1944) (usurious) ; Dunn
v. Midland Loan Finance Corp., 206 Minn. 550, 554, 289 N. W. 411, 413
(1939) (not usurious) ; see 6 Williston, Contracts § 1687(4) and cases cited.
27. One device, used with varying success to cover usury, is the sale of
property to the borrower by the lender at an exorbitant price. Proof of a
discrepancy between the value and the price is evidence of a usurious device
but is not conclusive. See Barry v. Paranto, 97 Minn. 265, 268, 106 N. W.
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appellate courts rarely disturb the finding on the question.29 As
pointed out in Dege v. Produce Exchange Bank,80 the degree of
proof of usury, whether asserted defensively or in seeking affirma-
tive relief, is the same as that in the ordinary civil case: proof by
a fair preponderance of the evidence. But while the court in the
Dcge case stated that there should be no hesitancy to pronounce
a contract usurious whenever the evidence is reasonably satisfac-
tory to show usury, nevertheless the same court two years later,
in Seebold v. Eustermann,3' indicated by dictum that usury laws
are to be strictly and not liberally applied.
While the 'Iinnesota Supreme Court has never held as a mattei
of law that a sale involving a cash price plus a finance charge
equalling a credit price is usurious, that situation has been care-
fully distinguished from that where the deal is closed at a credit
price, no cash price being involved. In Midland Loan Finance Co.
v. LorentzA:" the court distinguished Dunn v. Ml idland Loan Finance
Corp."' by pointing out that in the Dunn case the trial court found
no usury because there was no agreement binding the dealer to
sell at a cash price3 4 while in this case the dealer had agreed to a
binding cash price, resulting therefore in usury. Other courts have
similarly indicated the usuriousness of the time selling price arrived
at by adding charges to the unpaid balance of a cash price agreed
upon. 8 Some courts have even taken a further step and have held
911, 912 (1906) ; Saxe v. WVomack, 64 Minn. 162, 164, 66 N. W. 269
(1896). If the property has a readily ascertainable market price and is sold in
excess thereof, see Trauernicht v. Kingston, 156 Minn. 442, 443, 195 N. W. 278(1923), and the lender knows the borrower never particularly desired the
property itself, see Kommer v. Harrington, 83 Minn. 114, 117, 85 N. W.
939, 940 (1901), it is more than likely that the court will find that the sale
transaction was a mere sham and the excess in price in effect additional com-
pensation for lending money.
28. Bass v. Patterson, 68 Miss. 310, 8 So. 849 (1891); United Tire
& Inv. Co. v. Trone, 189 Okla. 120, 113 P. 2d 977 (1941) (jury found that
although handled by an auto dealer, a note and chattel mortgage were in
fact given for a loan from a finance company) ; Nazarian v. Lincoln Finance
Corp., 78 A. 2d 7 (R.I. 1951) (trial court found that the dealer was only a
conduit for a loan); see Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 573, 13
N. W. 2d 739, 743 (1944).
29. See, e.g., Brown v. Crandall, 218 S. C. 124, 61 S. E. 2d 761 (1950);
Reger v. O'Neal, 33 W. Va. 159, 10 S. E. 375 (1889).
30. 212 Minn. 44, 2 N. W. 2d 423 (1942).
31. 216 Minn. 566, 571, 13 N. W. 2d 739, 742 (1944).
32. 209 Minn. 278, 286, 296 N. W. 911, 915 (1941).
33. 206 Minn. 550, 289 N. W. 411 (1939).
34. The court in the Dunn case itself stated that "a binding sale price,
payable in whole or part by deferred payments . . . creates a debt for the
unpaid purchase price, or part thereof, and the granting of time to pay is a
forbearance to collect such existing debt, which it is conceded everywhere
is subject to the usury law." Id. at 555, 289 N. W. at 414.
35. See E. Tris Napier Co. v. Trawick, 164 Ga. 781, 782, 139 S. E.
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as a matter of law that where a finance charge is added to the un-
paid or "deferred" balance of the cash price to arrive at a time
price the substance of the transaction is a loan or forbearance of
money or of a debt ;3, if the additional charge is not for compen-
sation for extra services to the purchaser37 but for profit, that
amount is interest.38
Perhaps in unexpressed fear of upsetting thousands of deferred
payment contracts now outstanding 0 and destroying completely
the trade custom of the time sales plan used in automobile sales4"
552, 553 (1927) ; Associates Inv. Co. v. Sosa, 241 S. W. 2d 703, 706 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951) ; G. F. C. Corp. v. Williams, 231 S. E. 2d 565, 567 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1950) ; Associates Inv. Co. v. Baker, 221 S. W. 2d 363, 364 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949) (but no evidence of definite time price) ; Associates Inv.
Co. v. Lyon, 209 S. W. 2d 218, 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). A typical con-
ditional sales contract is illustrated in Associates Inv. Co. v. Sosa, supra
at 704:
"(A) Total Bona Fide Cash Price of Motor . ......... $2275.00
Vehicle $2250.00 plus $25.00 T&T
Payment r Cash ....................................$ 975.00P y t de-h    .....
(B) Total Down Payment ......................... 975.00
(C) Unpaid Cash Balance (Deferred Balance) ................... $1300.00
(D) Total finance charge and insurance premium
for which credit is extended ...................................... 437.64)
Type of Insurance $50.00 DD and Comp.-
24 months
....................................... ..............................................................................
(No insurance included unless described above)
The Time Balance (sum of C & D) $1737.60"
36. Bernhardt v. Atlantic Finance Corp., 311 Mass. 183, 40 N. E. 2d
713 (1942) ; Ferguson v. Grand Rapids Land Contract Co., 242 Mich. 314,
218 N. W. 685 (1928) ; Benton v. Sun Industries, 277 App. Div. 46, 97 N. Y.
S. 2d 736 (1st Dep't 1950) ; Morgan Motor & Finance Co. v. Oliver, 101
Utah 492, 124 P. 2d 778 (1942).
37. Such compensation is generally allowed, but a strict degree of
proof of reasonableness is required when it is challenged as usurious. See
Continental Nat. Bank v. Fleming, 170 Mich. 624, 644, 134 N. W. 656, 663
(1912). The fees cannot include general overhead, but may be for such
services as credit investigation which also inures to the lender's benefit.
Williams v. Personal Finance Co., 172 Tenn. 69, 109 S. W. 2d 1166 (1937) ;
cf. Hobart v. Michaud, 167 Minn. 1, 208 N. W. 191, rev'd on other grounds,
167 Minn. 1, 4, 209 N. W. 39 (1926).
38. Ferguson v. Grand Rapids Land Contract Co., 242 Mich. 314, 218
N. W. 685 (1928).
39. See Nelson v. Scaritt Motors, 48 So. 2d 168, 169 (Fla. 1950).
40. See Seebold v. Eustermarn, 216 Minn. 566, 581, 13 N. W. 2d 739,
747 (1944). Minnesota is one of -the comparatively few states which pro-
vide that if usury is found "All bonds, bills, notes . . . and all other con-
tracts . . .whereupon or whereby -there shall be reserved, secured, or taken
any greater sum or value for the loan or forbearance ... shall be void .... "
Minn. Stat. § 334.03 (1949). In the Seebold case, supra, a purchaser
brought replevin against a dealer to recover a truck which had been re-
possessed by self-help upon default; the conditional sales contract was
usurious. The majority opinion stated that the statute declared executory
contracts unenforceable, and although the result was harsh there could be
no quarrel with legislative policy. Restoration on the part of the person seek-
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many courts have paid only lip-service to the theory that the sub-
stance and not the form of the transaction is controlling 1 and
that whether usury exists is a question of fact.4 2 Courts have adopted
the reasoning of General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich43
and have strongly indicated that even where prior to the sales
transaction the lender furnished the dealer with forms and rates
and investigated credit that fact has little or no effect on whether
a sale is bona fide.44 One procedure favored when the price is in-
creased for credit is to make the test one of good faith.45 As re-
solved by another court this test became one of whether the dif-
ference in price was unfair or extortionate in view of the hazards
of the security.-" Worse yet, one trial court discussed the rule that
a sale on credit must not be a "cloak for a usurious loan" and
then without hearing any evidence held that no loan or forbearance
could be involved if the parties had agreed to a credit price.4 7 The
point completely overlooked by these courts is that the question
is whether the sale is actually a credit sale and not a mere device
to cover a loan or forbearance, which can be determined only by
considering all surrounding circumstances.4"
Not all courts, however, have indicated that they will look
beyond the form to the substance of the transaction in applying
the rule that a sale cannot be a device to evade the usury laws.
The definition of "forbearance" has been strictly limited to synony-
ing relief was unnecessary. But the court then reasoned that the conditional
sales contract being void, the purchaser had no right to possession of the
truck, and then reasoned: "The statute . . . is . . . a shield to protect the
weak. . ., but not a sword or rapier for offensive attack . .. Plaintiff can-
not take his claimed 'pound of flesh' without spilling blood." As a result of
this case, one suing to cancel an usurious contract would be wise to apply
for a temporary injunction pendente lite to prevent repossession of the
goods, coupled with an offer to pay the remaining instalments into court as
they come due. Otherwise, under the Seebold majority opinion, one could
be deprived of his right under the forfeiture statute by repossession of the
goods.
41. See note 26 supra.
42. See note 28 supra.
43. 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S. W. 425 (1924).
44. Cf. Attorney General v. Contract Purchasing Corp., 327 Mich. 636,
42 N. W. 2d 768 (1950); see Henry v. P. & E. Finance Co., 197 Okla.
676, 677, 174 P. 2d 373, 375 (1946).
45. See Commercial Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123, 125, 110
So. 39, 40 (1926) ; Blake Bros. v. Askew & Brummett, 112 Ark. 514, 520,
166 S. W. 965, 967 (1914) ; see 10 Minn. L. Rev. 550 (1926).
46. Grand Island Finance Co. v. Fowler, 124 Neb. 514, 247 N. W. 429(1933).
47. Levine v. Nolan Motors, 169 Misc. 1025, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 311 (Sup.
Ct. 1938).
48. See, e.g., Dege v. Produce Exchange Bank,, 212 Minn. 44, 46, 2
N. W. 2d 423, 424 (1942).
1952]
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mity with "loan" or even completely ignored as a factor. ° Con-
sequently, courts merely held that deferred payments were not a
forbearance5° or gave no explanation at all except that one could
sell his property for any price.5
Since a recurring factor influencing the courts to find usury
is the separate statement of the finance charge in the contract, -
an attempt to avoid such a finding may be made by stating only the
time price in the contract. Any evidence, however, whether ex-
trinsic or intrinsic may be used to prove that a finance charge was
agreed upon and therefore that the contract is really a usurious
device. 3
Furthermore, agreeing in advance of the sale to assign the con-
tract to the finance company denotes in reality a single transaction
for a loan.5 4 By this test automobile payment plans now existing
would fall automatically within the usury statutes, for it is common
knowledge that the actual control and management of the credit
and finance of automobile dealers is in the sales finance companies."G
If the finance charge or credit differential is not payment for
the use or detention of the balance for which credit is extended,
49. See Smith v. Kaufman, 145 Ark. 548, 224 S. W. 978 (1920);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S. W.
425 (1924).
50. Thomas v. Knickerbocker Operating Co., 108 N. Y. S. 2d 234 (Sup.
Ct. 1951) ; see Rattan v. Commercial Credit Co., 131 S. W. 2d 399 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939).
51. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Taylor, 294 S. W. 386 (Ark.
1927) ; Commercial Credit Co. v. Shelton, 139 Miss. 132, 104 So. 75 (1925) ;
American Loan Plan v. Frazell, 135 Neb. 718, 283 N.W. 836 (1939). See
the interesting case of Graham v. :Lynch, 206 Ga. 301, 57 S. E. 2d 86 (1950)
in which the instalment seller argued that he was a lender under the instal-
ment loan statute, which allowed a higher rate than the general usury
statute. The court, in affirming the finding below, said that the instalment
loan statute applied only to the lending of money and not a purchase of
property, but that the general usury statute applied here since the deferred
payments resulted in a greater rate of "interest" than allowed by law.
52. See Bernhardt v. Atlantic Finance Corp., 311 Mass. 183, 40 N. E.
2d 713 (1942) ; Morgan Motor & Finance Co. v. Oliver, 101 Utah 492, 124
P. 2d 778 (1942). When the price is agreed upon irrespective of credit and
thereafter charges are added this constitutes forbearance of an amount due
at once. Morgan Motor & Finance Co. v. Oliver, supra. But see Harper v.
Futrell, 204 Ark. 822, 824, 164 S. W. 2d 995, 996 (1942) ; Standard Motors
Finance Co. v. Mitchell Auto Co., 173 Ark. 875, 879, 293 S. W. 1026, 1027
(1927).
53. See Dege v. Produce Exchange Bank, 212 Minn. 44, 46, 2 N. W.
2d 423, 424 (1942).
54. See Benton v. Sun Industries, 277 App. Div. 46, 97 N. Y. S. 2d
736 (1st Dep't 1950).
55. See Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 744, 296
N. Y. Supp. 783, 785 (Buff. City Ct. 1937). But see Ecker, supra note 14,
at 179.
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it is difficult to determine just what it is intended to compensate;'G
no one has denied that there is profit to the sales finance corn-
pany. It is true that a sale on credit incurs risk, but there is risk in
most loans, and yet they are regulated by the law whether secured
or not.5 7 If the finance companies have a justifiable complaint that
under the usury laws there can be no profit, the remedy is to seek
legislation-not to evade the law by any and every device possible.
EXISTING INSTALIENT SALES ACTS
Since consumers have not been consistently protected against
exorbitant finance charges, especially in the financing of auto-
mobile sales,53 and because the bona fide cost of instalment credit
exceeds the rates generally allowed under usury statutes, 9 in recent
years a number of states have enacted some form of regulation
aimed particularly at automobile instalment sales.
Of the states providing regulation only California has no
licensing provision. 0 Other states at least require that sales finance
companies be licensed,61 with some states also licensing dealers 62
and, in Wisconsin, manufacturers and distributors of automobiles. 3
The licensing provision would seem to be a strong weapon in the
hands of the state agencies, as evidenced by its use in New York
in reducing the number of small loan usurers.6 4 In a few states,
however, when the cash sale price exceeds a specified amount, the
instalment sales act is inoperative. 65
56. See Frankfurt Finance Corp. v. Cox, 142 S. W. 2d 553, 554 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1940).
57. See Universal Credit Co. v. Lowell, 166 Misc. 15, 22, 2 N. Y. S.
2d 743, 750 (Roch. City Ct. 1938). The court also said: "May the vendor
make legal the unconscionable charge . . . for deferring payment of . . .
the cash purchase price.., by smoothly sugar-coating it with phraseology?"
58. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, § 602 (Supp. 1950).
59. See Seidman, Finance Companies and Factors 98 (1949).
60. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2981, 2982 (1949).
61. E.g., Ind. Ann. Stat. § 58-911 (Burns 1951) ; Me. Rev. Stat. c. 56,§ 264 (1944) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 23.628(3) (Supp. 1951) ; N. J. Stat. Ann.
§ 17:16B-2 (1950).
62. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, § 604 (Supp. 1950).
63. Wis. Stat. § 218.01(2) (1949).
64. See Bennett and Heffner, The Campaign Against Auto Loan
Usurers in New York State (1940).
65. Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. §§ 5963(a), 6698(a) (Supp. 1951) ($3000
limit); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 58-901 (Burns 1951) ($2500); Md. Ann. Code
Gen. Laws art. 83. § 139 (Cum. Supp. 1947) ; ($2000); N. J. Stat. Ann.§ 17:16B-1 (1950) ($3000). In Connecticut the statutory provisions for
instalment sales also apply to instalment loans. Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 6698(c) (1949). The practice of lifting regulation of charges when the prin-
cipal amount becomes fairly large seems to be favored in the states with
more liberal usuary statutes. For example, in New York a loan over the
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One requirement of every statute is that the terms of the sale
must be specified and a copy thereof furnished to the buyer. The
Michigan statute,6 6 which is typical, requires the contract to be
completed before signing ane. the following items to be recited
separately: cash price; down payment; balance due; cost of in-
surance and description thereof; other fees paid for the buyer's
benefit; balance financed; finance charge; time balance; and the
number, amount and due dates of instalments. It is required in addi-
tion that the buyer sign an acknowledgement that he received a
copy of the contract.07 The chief reason for such provisions is the
widespread practice of signing and accepting contracts in blank, 5
which would thus be curtailed.
Although all the states provide expressly for such disclosures,
they split on whether to regulate the finance charges by statute."3
When fixed by statute the rates are usually set by the age of the
automobile, varying as to new cars, cars up to two years old, and
older cars; the respective rates in those states are six, nine and
twelve per cent, computed on the whole amount and thus effectively
doubled.70 California does not make the distinction among classes
but sets a fiat rate of one per cent per month with an allowable
minimum of twenty-five dollars.71 An act proposed in New York
would adopt the method of varying rates according to classification,
evidently because they result more consistently in a fair profit for
the dealers and financing agencies.7 2 Similarly, four states have
express limitations upon refinancing charges, either limiting them
to an effective rate of about twelve per cent per year 73 or providing
amount of five thousand dollars repayable on demand and made upon col-
lateral security to a bank is not subject to the usury statutes and the interest
rate may be set by agreement. N. Y. Banking Law § 108(3).
66. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 23.628 (Supp. 1951).
67. E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 23.628(12e) (Supp. 1951), which also re-
quires that the acknowledgment be printed immediately below the space
provided for the buyer's signature to the contract and be independently
signed.
68. See Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Installment
Financing, State of New York Legislative Document No. 63, 21 (1949).
69. Regulation: Cal. Civ. Ccde § 2982(c) (1949); Mich. Stat. Ann.§ 23.628(18) (Supp. 1951); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, § 619 (Supp. 1950).
No statutory regulation: Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. §§ 6698 et seq. (1949);
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 58-901 et seq. (Bums 1951) ; Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws
art. 83, §§ 116 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1947); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 17:16B
(1950) ; Wis. Stat § 218.01 (1949).
70. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 23.628(18) (Supp. 1951) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69,§ 619 (Supp. 1950).
71. Cal. Civ. Code § 2982(c) (1949).
72. See Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Installment
Financing, op. cit. smipra note 68, at 43.
73. Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 6702 (1949) (12 per cent) ; N. J. Stat. Ann.
a, 17:16B-8 (1950) ($5.00 plus 10 per cent).
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a scale by classification which approximates the original charges
allowable.74 By either method, possible devices to evade the statutes
are eliminated.
In those states which have no express statutory rate limits 73
finance charges are usually controlled by requiring expressly by
statute or under general powers given to a state agency that the
finance companies licensed file rate charts with a state agency,7 6
which are accepted for filing unless the agency considers the rates
unconscionable.7 7 The Indiana Department of Financial Institu-
tions has gone even further under its broad powers 7s and prescribed
a complex formula for computation of maximum charges rated by
the class of the vehicle.7 9
Most of the regulatory acts also provide that a refund of the
finance charge shall be made for prepayment of the amount
financed : some acts make no specific provision, but a schedule
of refund rates may be required under the broad powers of the
state agency.8 Some form of regulation of refunds for prepayment
is needed, for sales finance companies in many instances have
no fixed policy covering rates for refunds given, if any.
8 2
It seems that none of the regulatory acts have effectively elimi-
nated dealer participation in the finance charge. Indiana has fixed
dealer participation at a percentage of the amount financed, ranging
from two to five per cent depending upon the class of the vehicle. 3
Michigan by statute has limited dealer participation to a percentage
of the amount financed but ostensibly only if the dealer has furnished
credit information or the instruments to carry out the transaction."
In actual operation it is fairly obvious that the limitation of dealer
participation will be ineffectual to stop those not actually providing
service from also obtaining the bonus, and, perhaps because of legis-
lative expediency, New York legislators have decided that dealer
74. 'Mich. Stat. Ann. § 23.628(19) (Supp. 1951) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69,
§ 620 (Supp. 1950).
75. See note 69, supra.
76. E.g., N. J. Stat. Ann. § 17:16B-2(c) (1950) (by statute); Wis.
Stat. § 218.01(5) (1949) (general powers).
77. See Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Installment
Financing, op. cit. supra note 68, at 29, 34.
78. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 58-906 (Burns 1951).
79. 1 Indiana Rules and Regulations 1053-1055 (1947).
80. E.g., Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 83, § 125 (Cum. Supp. 1947);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, § 622 (Supp. 1950).
81. E.g., 1 Indiana Rules and Regulations 1057-1058 (1947).
82. See Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Installment
Financing, op. cst. supra note 68, at 17.
83. 1 Indiana Rules and Regulations 1056 (1947).
84. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 23.628(31) (c) (Supp. 1951).
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participation in finance charges should not be outlawed because
dealers should be compensated. for their actual contribution in the
way of service.8 5 Actually, sales finance companies do all the credit
service, including furnishing forms, and the rates set up under these
acts supposedly have recognized such expenses as a cost of financing.
One form of legislation which should never be used to regulate
the charges on instalment sales is that now employed in Utah. The
statute provides that:
"No contract for the purchase of any goods, .. . or loan or for-
bearance of money, shall contain any ...service charge . ..
which when taken together with the interest charged on said
contract... exceeds ten per cent per annum ... except ... for
a service charge, which .. .shall not exceed four per cent per
annum of the unpaid balance..." 8
As far as this statute applies to instalment sales it might as well
not exist, for it speaks in terms of interest, and the Utah Supreme
Court has held that it does not prohibit a dealer from selling
goods on time at a higher price than he might have sold for cash
but only prohibits a transaction in which a price is agreed upon
and a time charge is added thereafter.87
To control the sales finance industry, licensing seems a neces-
sity. Essential provisions of any act are the disclosure provisions,
control of finance charges, refunds for prepayment, and dealer
participation. Whether rates should be specifically set out in the
statute or controlled by state agencies is a difficult question. While
there is some desirability in allowing fluctuations in finance charges
to be adjusted in view of the changing circumstances and to main-
tain the flow of consumer goods on instalment plans, expediency
should not be allowed to outweigh the public interest in definite
upper limits on finance charges, which, if excessive, tend to limit
the consumer purchasing power.8 8 It is apparent that many, though
perhaps not all, of the finance companies are out to get what the
market will bear. The present controls, other than the existing in-
stalment sales acts, are far too inconsistent to adequately restrict
harmful practices.
85. See Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Instalilmcnt
Financing, op. cit. supra note 68, at 43.
86. Utah Code Ann. § 44-0-2 (1943).
87. Mathis v. Holland Furnace Co., 109 Utah 449, 166 P. 2d 518(1946) ; see Morgan Motor & Finance Co. v. Oliver, 101 Utah 492, 502. 124
P. 2d 778, 782 (1942). See also Sayler v. Brady, 63 N. D. 471, 248 N. W.
673 (1933).
88. In either case, stringent penalties should be set out for violations of
the disclosure and rate provisions even if not wilful, unless the result of mere
clerical error.
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